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1 Introduction
Financial markets routinely experience a variety of frictions impacting price formation that
hinder their efficient functioning. These frictions are usually due to the organization of trad-
ing in a market, e.g. the design of a market structure or transaction costs, or to regulatory
constraints, such as short-sale restrictions or market fragmentation. Several studies have
recently exposed another source of friction: trading capital. As securities can be used as
collaterals to relax borrowing constraints, there is a natural interplay between the ease with
which traders can obtain funds (funding liquidity, henceforth) and the ease with which an
asset is traded (market liquidity, henceforth).
Despite the mounting theoretical and empirical evidence documenting the impact of both
funding and market illiquidity on asset prices (see, among others, Vayanos and Wang (2012);
Foucault, Pagano, and Roell (2013)), less is known about the empirical relationships jointly
linking the two dimensions of illiquidity. This paper aims at filling this gap and proposes an
empirical investigation of the dynamic relationships between funding and market illiquidity
in the context of the European Treasury bond market. We focus on this market because
of its large size, the wide use of the traded Treasury securities in repo transactions1, and
its institutional features whereby trading occurs in a large supranational secondary market
whose liquidity conditions respond to aggregate funding illiquidity shocks.
We take explicitly into account the endogeneity that naturally arises between the two
dimensions of liquidity and adopt an empirical methodology, i.e. Identification through Het-
eroskedasticity (ITH henceforth), that has been successfully used in other contexts (Rigobon
(2003), Rigobon and Sack (2003), Rigobon and Sack (2004)). We then quantify economi-
cally the responses of market illiquidity to and from funding illiquidity shocks and exploit
1It is important to note that the European repo market differs substantially from the U.S. repo market
along various dimensions. This in turn suggests that counterparty risk may play a different role compared to
the evidence reported in previous studies. See, for example, Mancini, Ranaldo, and Wrampelmeyer (2016)
for a discussion on differences between the U.S. and the European repos markets, and their potential impact
on the resiliency of the repo market.
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the heterogeneity in the cross-section of government bonds’ characteristics, across European
countries, to investigate the determinants of the liquidity responses.
Using a dataset containing all European Treasury bonds that are traded on the Mercato
Telematico dei Titoli di Stato (MTS henceforth) platforms over the period October 1st, 2004
- February 28th, 2011,2 we carry out our estimation and find a host of interesting results.
First, we show that shocks to funding illiquidity significantly and positively affect the
market illiquidity of the European Treasury market, after controlling for endogeneity. A
one standard deviation shock to funding illiquidity, denoting increased funding constraints,
increases market illiquidity by 0.15 standard deviation. This positive impact is consistent
with most studies in this literature.3 Furthermore, and unlike in the previous literature, our
econometric model uncovers evidence of a positive and significant feedback effect whereby one
standard deviation shock to market illiquidity across European Treasury markets generates
a increment of 0.08 standard deviation of funding illiquidity. This latter result is crucial
for two reasons. First, it shows the presence of a feedback effect from market illiquidity to
funding illiquidity, which has been theoretically formalized by Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009) and Gromb and Vayanos (2010) but never formally tested in a joint setting4. Second,
it sheds further light on the direction of this impact, since both theoretical models suggest
2MTS is the most important electronic platform for euro-denominated government bonds and it consists
of number of domestic markets (i.e., local MTS) and a centralized European marketplace (i.e., EuroMTS).
3See, among others, Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001), Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam
(2005), Coughenour and Saad (2004), Comerton-Forde, Hendershott, Jones, Moulton, and Seaholes (2010),
Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan (2010), Jensen and Moorman (2010), Bessembinder, Jacobsen, Maxwell,
and Venkatamaran (2016), Rapp (2017)), Coffey, Hrung, and Sarkar (2009), Mancini Griffoli and Ranaldo
(2010), Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014), Fontaine and Garcia (2012), or Hu, Pan, and Wang (2013), Trebbi
and Xiao (2015), Pelizzon, Subrahmanyam, Tomio, and Uno (2016) and Deuksar and Johnson (2017).
Our results also complement studies that address differently the endogeneity issue by exploiting Lehman
bankruptcy as instrument (Aragon and Strahan (2012)), natural experiments such as variations or shocks
to margin requirements (Miglietta, Picillo, and Pietrunti (2015), Hedegaard (2014), Jylha¨ (2017)), or a
regression discontinuity design (Kahramand and Tookes (2017)) to identify a causal relationship funding
constraints and market illiquidity.
4For example, other studies that have attempted to explore the empirical implications of the relevant the-
oretical models (see for example Boudt, Paulus, and Rosenthal (2017), Dick-Nielsen and Gyntelberg (2013))
have only looked at either one side of the relationship between market and funding illiquidity or at both
sides but separately. These approaches thus miss the crucial aspects of endogeneity and joint determination
of both dimensions of liquidity that are key to uncovering liquidity spirals and their stabilizing/destabilizing
dynamics
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that the impact of market on funding liquidity can either be stabilizing or destabilizing
depending on the equilibrium or on model’s parameters. The dual reinforcing relationship
between funding and market illiquidity that we document is at the core of the existence of
potential illiquidity spirals.5
Second, after estimating the responses of market illiquidity to funding shocks for indi-
vidual bonds in our sample, we find that these coefficients are on average positive, but with
a different size across bonds. In other words, market illiquidity for individual bonds react
differently to tightening funding constraints. This suggests that the role of intermediaries
is on average destabilizing. We also find that the responses to funding illiquidity shocks
are higher for long-term bonds, which are more capital intensive than short-term bonds.
Interestingly, they decrease with the number of sovereign bonds issued by the country. By
contrast, the responses of funding illiquidity to individual bonds’ market illiquidity shocks
are lower for bonds with higher haircuts, that are used less frequently as collaterals in repo
transaction.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the mechanisms high-
lighted in the theoretical literature to explain the interplay between funding and market
liquidity. Section 3 describes our empirical framework and introduces the measures used to
proxy for market and funding illiquidity. Section 4 describes the data used in this study,
presents preliminary summary statistics and reports the results of the main estimations.
Section 5 discusses the results of the cross-sectional analysis and a final section concludes.
2 Intermediary asset pricing
The idea that market illiquidity is influenced by the risk-bearing capacity of market par-
ticipants, which in turn is related to the amount of capital allocated to this activity, is not
5Our results have thus important implications for the new margin regulation for non-centrally cleared
derivatives. In fact, shocks affecting initial and variation margins (hence impacting funding illiquidity) may
not only have a first-order effect on trading capital, and overall credit risk, but also affect by a significant
extent market illiquidity.
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new. When investors need to trade and need immediacy, their demand would typically be
absorbed by financial intermediaries. Various models suggest that these participants’ wealth
may be used directly to buy financial assets or as collateral to borrow cash or securities and
engage into these activities.
On the one hand, market makers temporarily absorb imbalance by holding a possibly
short term position in their inventory. Following the traditional inventory models (see Dem-
setz (1968), Stoll (1978), or Ho and Stoll (1981)), Weill (2007) formalizes the existence of
the link between the cost faced by market makers to raise capital and liquidity provision.
On the other hand, other intermediaries such as mutual or hedge funds, may either be
ready to absorb imbalance for a longer period, or to arbitrage prices. Even more capital is
required for these activities, as participants need to hold positions for some time or across
large baskets of securities. Constraints on the borrowing capacity may indeed create what
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) name “limits to arbitrage”. In particular, the authors show that
investors’ outflows from managed funds can amplify financial assets’ negative “sentiment”
shocks. The literature has shed light on other mechanisms, like endogenous margin con-
straints (Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Geanakoplos (2003)) or the role of repos (Huh and
Infante (2016)), and analyzed their impact in various context, i.e., across markets (Kyle
and Xiong (2001)) or during a financial crisis (He and Krishnamurthy (2012) and He and
Krishnamurthy (2013)).
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), and Gromb and Vayanos (2010) are among the first
to elaborate on the two-sided nature of the relationship between funding illiquidity and mar-
ket illiquidity, which is the main focus of our paper. When a trader buys a security that he
can use as collateral to borrow a fraction of its value against it, or when the arbitrageurs
face collateral-based financial constraints limiting their investment capacity, illiquidity as-
sumes a dual perspective: two notions of funding and market illiquidity affect each other.
Depending on the equilibrium or on the model’s parameters, financial intermediaries may
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have a stabilizing or a destabilizing role, leading to cases of perverse illiquidity spirals.
3 The Empirical framework
In this section, we first introduce the empirical methodology adopted to identify the dy-
namic relationships between funding and market illiquidity based on the heteroskedasticity
of illiquidity measures (Rigobon (2003) and Rigobon and Sack (2003)) and then discuss the
main empirical proxies for market and funding illiquidity used in the empirical investigation.
3.1 Identification through heteroskedasticity
The framework adopted in our empirical investigation takes into account the fact that mar-
ket and funding illiquidity are endogenously and jointly determined. Theories of financial
intermediation suggest a direct dual causality between the two dimensions of illiquidity.
Nonetheless, the empirical identification of this relationship is not a trivial task. In fact,
as illiquidity conditions are initially observed at different and potentially low frequencies, it
difficult to empirically disentangle whether any shock to one of the two dimensions of illiq-
uidity causes changes in the other or whether both dimensions of illiquidity are endogenously
determined.
We do not take a stand on a specific direction of causality and investigate the joint
dynamic interaction between market and funding illiquidity by adopting the methodology
proposed in Rigobon (2003) and Rigobon and Sack (2003). For the sake of exposition, we
present below the simplest version of their model but in the empirical estimation we will
consider the case where exogenous control variables are added to incorporate the potential
effect of other factors affecting both market and funding illiquidity.
Let market and funding illiquidity follow the system of simultaneous equations:
mt = βft + t (1)
ft = αmt + ηt, (2)
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where mt and ft are measures of aggregate market and funding illiquidity, respectively; t
and ηt are the structural shocks with zero mean and variances σ
2
 and σ
2
η, and β and α are
the key parameters of interest in the model. We assume that the shocks affecting market
and funding illiquidity in the model are uncorrelated, i.e. E(tηt) = 0.
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Albeit very stylized, equations (1)-(2) have a straightforward interpretation in light of
existing theoretical frameworks. In fact, the first equation of the system captures the finding
whereby any asset’s market illiquidity is a function of funding illiquidity affecting trading in
that market.7 The second equation is less rooted into these specific theoretical frameworks.
In light of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), the equation can be viewed as a simplified
counterpart of the finding that the shadow cost of capital, used as proxy for a common
funding illiquidity measure, is a function of market illiquidity and endogenous margins.8 An
alternative mechanism relates to market liquidity impacting capital gains on the arbitrageurs’
existing positions but also their rebalancing decisions. On one hand, market illiquidity
reduces the arbitrageurs’ capital gain, which tightens their financial constraint. On the
other hand, it reduces the maximum loss the position can experience in the subsequent
period, which relaxes the financial constraint. In Gromb and Vayanos (2010), the mispricing
wedge is a present value of future expected excess returns that are equalized across markets
in equilibrium, and thus depends on sources of asset volatility. It is worth noticing that both
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and Gromb and Vayanos (2010) suggest that financial
intermediaries may either play a stabilizing role (α < 0) or a destabilizing role (α > 0)
depending on the equilibrium selected or on parameters’ values.
Several studies have taken a specific stance and estimated a one-way causality relationship
summarized by the parameter β usually found different from zero and statistically significant
at conventional level. A few other studies have incidentally noted that α may also be different
6We will discuss the relaxation of this assumption later in the text below.
7See Proposition 1 in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), p. 2211, or Proposition 1 in Gromb and
Vayanos (2010), p. 462.
8See equation (14) and Propositions 2,3 in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).
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from zero. However, existing studies did not explicitly take into account the joint and
contemporaneous relationship between the two dimensions of illiquidity and their natural
endogeneity. In fact, the system above cannot be estimated unless further information is
incorporated. This is because an identification problem occurs, as the covariance matrix of
the reduced form of the above system of equation provides only three moments (variance
of funding and market illiquidity and their covariance), but four parameters have to be
estimated (namely α, β, and two variances).
Rigobon (2003) suggests that if the variance of the structural shocks is subject to regimes,
then the identification problem can be solved.9 This identification procedure can be intu-
itively explained in light of the simple model (1)-(2). Assume for simplicity that the variance
of -shocks is constant while the variance of η-shocks is subject to two regimes, namely high
or low. If the structural parameters α and β are stable across regimes, then the covariance
matrix of the reduced form, as it is regime-specific, will provide six moments (three per
regime) for six parameters to be estimated (namely α, β, and four variances), which solves
the identification problem. The estimation of the two structural parameters assumes that
the relative variances of market and funding illiquidity shocks change over time. Consider
the second regime in which the variance of funding illiquidity shocks is high. If an econome-
trician observes a contemporaneous increase in market illiquidity, given the assumption that
the covariance between funding and market illiquidity shocks is zero, the change in market
illiquidity is exclusively due, in light of the above system of equations, to the effect of funding
illiquidity on market illiquidity (i.e. βft).
10 By observing the changes in market and funding
illiquidity in this specific volatility regime, then it is possible to back out the value of the
9ITH is not the only solution to the identification problem highlighted above. In fact, the parameters α
and β can still be estimated by 1) imposing zero or sign restrictions on the parameters, 2) assuming long-run
constraints, or 3) imposing constraints on variances. See Chapter 14 in Kilian and Lu¨tkepohl (2017) and the
references therein.
10A quasi-natural experiment (such as Jylha¨ (2017)) would use an exogenous shock on funding constraints
to identify the impact on market illiquidity; intuitively, our approach relies on probabilistic shocks rather
than on a one-shot event.
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parameter β. A similar narrative applies for the estimation of the other parameter α.
More formally, under the assumption of two regimes, the regime-specific covariance ma-
trix of the reduced form can be written as follows:
Ωs =
1
(1− αβ)2
[
β2σ2η,s + σ
2
,s β
2σ2η,s + ασ
2
,s
. σ2η,s + α
2σ2,
]
=
[
ω11,s ω12,s
. ω22,s
]
, (3)
where s ∈ {1, 2}. Solving for the variances in the regime-dependent reduced form, leads to
the definition of the estimates of the parameters β and α (see Appendix 1 in the Internet
Appendix for more details). The β parameter is estimated as:
β =
ω12,s − αω11,s
ω22,s − αω12,s ,
and the parameter α solves the following quadratic equation:
[ω11,1ω12,2 − ω12,1ω11,2]α2 − [ω11,1ω22,2 − ω22,1ω11,2]α + [ω12,1ω22,2 − ω22,1ω12,2] = 0.
In our empirical investigation we follow Rigobon and Sack (2003) and use an extended
model that accounts for additional control variables that proxy for factors that may affect
the dynamics of both dimensions of illiquidity, that is,
mt = βft + θxt + t, (4)
ft = αmt + φxt + ηt, (5)
where xt is a vector of exogenous variables.
11
The extended model relies on three key assumptions. First, ITH relies on a shift in the
relative variances of the shocks across regimes. It thus requires any form of heteroskedasticity
in the data, that may come for instance from economic events, policy shifts. ITH fails if
the two covariance matrices are proportional, i.e. the relative variances are constant across
11 See also Appendix 2 in the Internet Appendix for further details.
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regimes. However, it is important to note that if the heteroskedasticity is misspecified in
this model, the coefficients are still consistent (Rigobon (2003), Section IV). Furthemore,
ITH does not require the volatility regimes to be identified optimally (e.g., by identifying
structural breaks). It only requires sufficient heteroskedasticity to define at least two regimes
in which the variances of the residuals are different.
Second, the parameters α and β are assumed to be time invariant as the volatility of
shocks changes. As this is an important assumption for the validity of the model, we discuss
it further in Section 5.2.
Third, the structural - and η-shocks are not correlated. However, this assumption is
relaxed by including common unobservable heteroskedastic shocks in the model (Rigobon,
2003, Section III). The drawback of this amendment is that one cannot fully characterize
the parameter α. Instead, we can only obtain a convolution comprising the parameter of
interest α together with the coefficient on the (unobserved) common shock in the market
illiquidity equation.12
3.2 Empirical proxies
It is worthwhile noting that the existing literature uses various measures to capture different
aspects of market and funding illiquidity across markets, that we present below. We ac-
knowledge that the various measures only proxy illiquidity along one dimension and cannot
perfectly reflect its multifaceted nature. In our empirical investigation, we report and discuss
our baseline results both in terms of single representative measures of market and funding
illiquidity and, in the spirit of Korajczyk and Sadka (2008), the first principal components
computed across the pool of all empirical proxies discussed in this Section. All our variables
are observed or computed at the weekly frequency.
12Full details of this alternative estimation are discussed in Section 5.2.
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3.2.1 Market illiquidity measures
We consider four alternative variables to measure market illiquidity. First, for each bond
j in our sample, we use intraday quote data to compute the average daily relative quoted
bid-ask spread defined as follows:
BASjd =
1
NQjd
NQjd∑
i=1
(Askji −Bidji )
(Askji +Bid
j
i )/2
,
where d indexes the day, Bid ji and Ask
j
i are the i -th bid and ask quote prices, NQ
j
d is the
total number of quote revisions for day d.13
Second, we compute the daily average effective spread of bond j, which measures the
difference between the transaction price and the mid-quote price prevailing at the time of
the trade:
EBASjd =
1
NT jd
NT jd∑
τ=1
(
TPricejτ − (Ask
j
τ+Bid
j
τ )
2
)
(Askjτ+Bid
j
τ )
2
× dirτ ,
where Bid jτ and Ask
j
τ are the best ask quote prices prevailing before the τth trade, TPrice
j
τ
is the execution price, NT jd is the total number of trades for day d, and dirτ the direction of
the trade that takes value 1 if the trade is initiated by a buy order, and −1 otherwise. Both
measures are then averaged at the weekly level as follows:
BASjt =
1
D(t)
D(t)∑
d=1
BASjd,
EBASjt =
1
D(t)
D(t)∑
d=1
EBASjd.
where D(t) is the number of trading days in week t. Effective spreads abstract from intraday
patterns and successfully capture the (indirect) cost of an aggressive transaction, whatever
its size, which indirectly accounts for market depth. Besides, they better capture the fact
that traders strategically trade when spreads are low, which is particularly important in
13To avoid outliers we exclude quotes with the bid-ask spread greater than 100 basis points and those
outside the trading hours (8:15 am - 5:30pm Central European Time).
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markets where there are only few trades a day. We therefore use this variable EBAS as our
proxy for market illiquidity when focusing on single measures of illiquidity.
Third, while the spread measures matter for brokers and investors, they may not perfectly
reflect the capacity of the market to absorb orders without moving prices. We therefore use
a measure of the “price impact” of transactions, in the spirit of Kyle’s lambda, measured as
in Hasbrouck (1991) using the following Vector Autoregressive (VAR) for each bond j:
qrτ =
m∑
i=1
ajt,iqrτ−i + b
j
t,0xτ +
m∑
i=1
bjt,ixτ−i + v1τ ,
xτ =
m∑
i=1
cjt,iqrτ−i +
m∑
i=1
djt,ixτ−i + v2τ ,
where qr τ is the change in mid-quote prices due to a trade at date τ and xτ is the net
aggregate buy and sell volume for all trades executed between transaction time τ − 1 and
time τ . v1τ is the innovation in quote change, v2τ is the unexpected component of the order
flow, m is the order lags in the autoregression while ajt ’s, b
j
t ’s, c
j
t ’s and d
j
t ’s are the coefficients
estimated for bond j in week t. The coefficient bj0 measures the immediate price response
to the trade and is used as our price impact measure. We use the intraday time series of
transactions data over a one week period to estimate the coefficients on a weekly basis.14
Fourth, another conventional empirical proxy for market illiquidity used in asset pricing
studies is the ILLIQ measure developed by Amihud (2002). This measure is defined as the
average of the daily ratio of bond j’s absolute returns to the total trading volume over a
period of D days in week t:
ILLIQjt =
1
D
D∑
d=1
|rjd|
V jd
,
where rjd is the daily return and V
j
d is the total trading volume on day d in week t. Similarly
to Hasbrouck (1991)’s b0 coefficient, ILLIQ measure captures the average price impact over D
trading days. A bond is less liquid or, put differently, ILLIQ is high if a small trading volume
14In our empirical exercise, we find that three is the appropriate order of lags m in the model.
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can induce a large price change. The ILLIQ measure uses more aggregated information than
the three measures defined above (namely, daily rather than intradaily) and may be less
affected by microstructure noise.15
3.2.2 Funding illiquidity measures
We consider four alternative variables to capture funding illiquidity conditions in the Euro-
pean Treasury bond market. The first three are spreads between money market rates with
the maturity of one week, using the Euro interbank offered rate (Euribor), the overnight
index swap rate (OIS), the repo rate (Eurepo), and the main refinancing operation rate
(MRO).
Offered rates are interest rates over unsecured deposits that a bank is willing to of-
fer to another bank over a given maturity term. They can be high because of larger de-
fault/counterparty risk or because of poor interbank liquidity conditions. An overnight
index swap is an agreement between two counterparts to pay the difference between a fixed
interest rate and an average of overnight interest rates, i.e. the EONIA in the context of the
euro area. By contrast to Euribor, OIS reflects little default or liquidity risk as the contract
does not involve the exchange of principal while only net interest obligations are settled
at maturity. Our first proxy for funding illiquidity, the Euribor-OIS spread, thus reflects
the state of credit and funding conditions in the interbank market. Recent findings suggest
that liquidity conditions, not credit conditions, are the main drivers of short-term interbank
spreads (Schwartz (2017)). We therefore use this variable as our proxy for funding illiquidity
when focusing on single measures of illiquidity.
Eurepo is the rate at which a prime bank offers funds in euro to another prime bank
against an accepted asset of suitable quality, i.e. Eurepo General Collateral serving as the
15Amihud (2002) uses daily data over a period of one year to calculate an ILLIQ measure for an asset in a
given month. The existence of a small number of extremely large values may raise concerns (see Bali, Engle,
and Murray (2016)). As a preliminary check, we first removed for all bonds any observations lying beyond
two standard deviations from their mean before computing the ILLIQ measure. The correlation between the
ILLIQ series with and without outliers over our sample period is equal to 0.91 and statistically significant.
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collateral in the transaction. Our second proxy for funding illiquidity, the Euribor spread over
the Eurepo, thus captures the state of funding conditions for unsecured relative to secured
money market transactions in the euro area. This measure may complement the Euribor-
OIS spread by accounting for changes in funding conditions independently of a higher risk
aversion, a higher preference for cash or a greater uncertainty in the collateral value, which
are associated with a higher repo spread (as indicated by Ho¨rdahl and King (2008)).16
MRO involves weekly auctions at which banks borrow money with one week maturity,
i.e. allotted liquidity, from the ECB secured against a collateral accepted by the central
bank. MRO remains one of the most important tools used by the European Central Bank
to manage liquidity and implement monetary policies in the euro area (ECB, 2011). Using
proprietary data on individual demands by financial institutions during the ECB auctions
between June 2005 and October 2008, Drehman and Nikolaou (2013) show that an increase
in auction rates in MROs is associated with higher funding constraints faced by banks and
a reduction in market liquidity across stock, bond and money markets in the euro area. Our
third measure of funding illiquidity is the difference between the average main refinancing
operation (MRO) rate and the OIS rate.
Finally, the last funding illiquidity measure we considered is not directly obtained from
money market spreads but has been associated with funding conditions in the US Treasury
market, namely the noise measure introduced by Hu et al. (2013).17 This measure is based on
the assumption that the availability of capital allows traders to engage in arbitrage activities
16Although European Money Markets Institute decided to discontinue to publish the Eurepo index
from Jan 2015, an emerging benchmark for repo market in the euro area is RepoFunds Rate (see
http://www.repofundsrate.com). This rate captures the repo transactions executed on the BrokerTec and
MTS trading platform. However, due to the limited availability of historical data of RepoFunds Rate, we
use Eurepo rate in our study.
17It is instructive to note that most of the existing literature aiming at measuring funding illiquidity relies
on empirical proxies based on interest rates. A related strand of literature has extensively documented the
role of interest rates, especially their variation due to monetary policy actions, on asset prices. As asset
prices are a crucial channel through which illiquidity spirals develop, the use of these empirical proxies for
funding illiquidity based on interest rates may generate an additional layer of endogeneity when trying to
disentangle the dynamics relationship between funding and market illiquidity. Although we think this issue
is important and deserve an adequate investigation, we leave it as an avenue to pursue in future research.
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and help smooth out yield differentials around an equilibrium yield curve. When funding
constraints bind and arbitrage capital is curtailed, bond yields become more disconnected
from each other. That, as a result, leads to bonds that are priced away from their equilibrium
values. Put differently, when funding conditions deteriorate, bond prices become more noisy.
According to Hu et al. (2013), this measure of noise can be empirically computed as the root-
mean-squared-error of market yields and a given equilibrium model yields, across all bonds:
Noiset =
√√√√ 1
Nt
Nt∑
i=1
(
yit − yib,t
)2
,
where Nt is the number of bonds, y
j
t is the market yield of bond j and y
j
b,t is the implied
model bond yield at time t. In our empirical exercise, we first compute equilibrium yield
curves by means of the Nelson and Siegel (1987) methodology using bonds with maturity
ranging from 1 year to 10 years for France, Germany, Italy and Spain. We then compute a
noise measure for each country on weekly basis and obtain an aggregate noise measure as
the first principal component computed across the four countries.18,19
4 Data and institutional details
In this section, we first present the data and the descriptive statistics of the various illiq-
uidity measures. Prior to estimating the reduced-form model and adopt the identification
methodology discussed in Section 3.1, we formally test that time series of the variables of
interest are indeed subject to heteroskedasticity and introduce our volatility regimes. We
finally explore the dynamic relationship between funding and market illiquidity using this
18As Hu et al. (2013) show that their main results are not specific to a particular curve-fitting method
employed, we chose to adopt a Nelson and Siegel (1987) methodology.
19In a previous draft of this study, we have included Fontaine and Garcia (2012)’s measure that is based
on the interest rate differential between on-the-run / off-the-run bonds with similar maturities. However,
since most Treasury agencies in Europe use re-openings to provide markets with a supply of off-the-run
treasury securities, this measure may not be a suitable proxy for funding illiquidity in Europe. Nonetheless,
the baseline results computed by including the Fontaine and Garcia (2012)’s measure are not very different
from the baseline results reported in Section 5 and they are available from the authors upon request.
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framework.
4.1 European government bond markets and the trading environ-
ment
Our study examines bonds issued by the governments of the ten Euro-area countries including
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and
Spain, with maturities between one year and thirty years.20 Similarly to Beber, Brandt,
and Kavajecz (2009), we only select fixed-rate and zero coupon bonds and exclude those
with special fixed-income features such as floating rate coupons, inflation-linked or inflation-
indexed indexed bonds, securities traded prior to issue (when issued).21
The European Treasury bond markets combine electronic trading with dealer markets,
where investment banks commit their own capital and provide liquidity to facilitate trading.
This European government dealer bond market is reputed transparent ex ante (with dealers
advertising the prices at which they are prepared to trade), but not ex post.22 In particular,
closing prices are available through data vendors but there is little to none information about
trading volumes, even aggregated at a yearly frequency. The bond market data used in this
study is from MTS Data, a product of MTS that is the most important electronic platform
for euro-denominated government bonds. The MTS Data database has been analyzed in
previous studies (see for instance Beber et al. (2009); Dufour and Nguyen (2012); Pelizzon
et al. (2016)). Due to the lack of transparency on the OTC trades, it is however impossible to
precisely quantify the market share of MTS relative to other dealer trading. Public reports
available online suggest that roughly half of the trading would be electronic and half OTC
20The Euro Bond Market Study of the European Central Bank published in December 2004 shows that
three countries, namely Italy, Germany, and France, account for more than 70% of the total outstanding
amount of government bonds in the euro area. The same report shows that Luxembourg has no debt
outstanding, while the sovereign of Ireland was very small. Those two countries are thus not part of our
analysis.
21According to the study by ECB (2004), fixed-rate coupon bonds remain the most popular instrument
capturing a 65% share of the total outstanding amount.
22An investor looking to buy or sell a bond can, again with a few exceptions, come to a bank and obtain
a price at which the dealer is willing to sell or buy that bond.
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over our sample period.23
Our data consists of local MTS and a centralized EuroMTS. Persaud (2006) reports that
the MTS platforms jointly cover just over 70% of the overall electronic trading of European
government bonds around the sample period used in the empirical investigation. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that most of the trading in the electronic secondary market takes place
in the local MTS while the amount of trading occurring on the centralized European MTS
does not exceed 5% of the total trading.24 MTS is an inter-dealer, fully-electronic and
quote-driven market characterized by a high degree of transparency.25
Intermediation in the secondary Treasury market is still almost exclusively provided by
traditional bank dealers, with little involvement of non-bank market-makers.26 Local banks
are key financial intermediaries in the European Treasury bond markets.27 There are two
types of market participants on the MTS platform: “market makers” and “market takers.”
Market makers with specific market-making obligations have to post firm two-sided quotes
for a minimum size, a maximum spread and a minimum number of hours during the trading
day. Once a quote is submitted to the network, it is ranked in the limit order book according
to price-time priority rules and MTS publishes the best five quotes on either side of the book.
Some participants (e.g. hedge funds) do not meet the requirements to be “market makers”
and hence can only be eligible for a market taking status. MTS requires market takers to
23A report by Greenwich Associates based on interviews with investment grade institutional investors,
indicates that 39% (resp. 47%) of European government bonds are traded electronically in 2008 (resp. 2012)
(source:
https://www.greenwich.com/blog/electronic-trading-bonds-growing-%E2%80%93-sort-of%E2%80%A6. Ac-
cording to the European Securities Markets Expert Group (ESME) report published in 2006, around 50%
of trading in government bonds was conducted over the telephone.
24A report on price discovery published in August 2010 by the Association for Financial Markets in Europe
(AFME) indicates an average daily turnover on MTS of 85 billion euros (single counted and including repo).
25All platforms publish post-trade prices for trades conducted on their platforms on a realtime basis. In
the case of inter-dealer platforms, these prices can only be viewed by platform participants. Exception is
inter-dealer platform MTS, which makes post-trade prices available to third parties through data vendors.
26This contrasts with the situation in the U.S. where inter-dealer platforms have granted more lenient
access to non-bank players, including PTFs (Principal Trading Firms), according to a report from the BIS
(2016).
27Brutti and Saure´ (2015) report that over our sample period, the percentage of public debt holdings by
local banks relative to total bank-held debt of issuing countries varies from 40% to 75% during the crisis
period for GIIPS countries, and remains stable at approximately 35% for other Euro Area countries.
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have net assets of at least 10 million euros. These participants can only use market orders
to hit the best outstanding quotes. The minimum quantity for quotes and trades on MTS
is one million euros. Executed trades are immediately and automatically reported.
4.2 Data and summary statistics
We first collect the daily trading summaries of all European Treasury bonds denominated in
euros and with a maturity longer than one year that are traded in the platform EuroMTS
provided by MTS Data. It involves the closing bond prices, yield, time to maturity, duration,
the total trading volume as well as the number of market makers during the day of 452
bonds, traded both in Local MTS and in EuroMTS. Our sample period spans from October
1st, 2004 to February 28th, 2011.28 Next, we define our volatility regimes based on the
vStoxx index, depending on whether the value of the index falls below its mean minus one
standard deviation (“low vStoxx” regime), is above its mean plus one standard deviation
(“high vStoxx” regime), or in-between the two (intermediate regime). We then focus on
bonds that are traded at least fifteen days in each of the three volatility regimes.29
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the government bonds. Panel (a) describes
the statistics by country (averaging measures per bond then country). We first collect some
of the characteristics of each bond as it first appears in the sample, namely its yield, time to
maturity, duration, coupon’s rate and number of registered market makers. Statistics on the
number of trades and trade size are computed over the whole sample period. Overall, we have
149 unique securities across the ten countries.30 Bonds of most countries have an average
28Note that our sample period includes the recent 2008-2009 financial crisis but not the downgrade of
Spain and Italy that took place on October 7, 2011.
29In the Internet Appendix, we identify the volatility regimes directly from the time-series data as a
robustness check, defining the various regimes from the reduced-form residuals by computing rolling-window
variances of 20-week worth of observations for each variable. The advantage of defining volatility regimes
exogenously is that the regimes are the same for all bonds in our sample, which enables us to check that
these bonds are traded in each regime.
30Our main analysis focuses on a subsample of 149 bonds that are traded in the platform EuroMTS at
least fifteen days in each of our three volatility regimes. This restriction enables us to compare estimates
of αj and βj in Section 5.3 since all the estimations are based on the same volatility regimes. However,
it induces us to restrict our attention to a subsample of bonds. In the Internet Appendix, we check the
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duration between seven and nine years. German bonds exhibit the lowest yields while those
from Greece record the highest. Italian Treasury bonds have the highest trading volume.
This may not be surprising since Mercato dei Titoli di Stato (MTS), the first venue for
electronic trading of Treasury bonds, was initially launched in 1988 by the Italian Treasury
and the Bank of Italy, before EuroMST began its expansion across Europe in 1997. Bonds
from Belgium, Finland, Greece, Italy and Portugal exhibit a higher activity than bonds from
other countries, measured in number of trades as well as in the number of participants. These
countries have either bonds with lower maturities or large amounts of debt outstanding.31
Panel (b) provides statistics on the cross-section of the 149 individual bonds (averaging
measures per bond first). Bonds in our sample are characterized by a large heterogeneity,
with a time to maturity spanning from 3.02 to 30.09 years, or a number of trades per week
spanning from almost 3 to 97. To further investigate the sources of heterogeneity, we report
additional descriptive statistics on the bonds’ characteristics. Haircuts required when the
bond is used as a collateral are available for February 2011; our measure Haircut is computed
as the average haircut per bond across time during this month.32 Haircuts are usually set
as a function of the time to maturity, the coupon’s structure and the credit quality of the
issuer. The Credit Default Swap captures the Credit quality of the issuer.33 Finally, we
introduce a proxy for the capacity of the sovereign bond to be used as a safe asset in a
Flight to Quality episode. To this end, we first run individual bond regressions of the bond’s
weekly yield change on first difference of the average spread across the 5-year CDS contracts
of all European countries (using data from Bloomberg). Our variable Flight To Quality is
robustness of our results to the sample of bonds, by estimating our model using an extended sample of 452
bonds traded in EuroMTS over the sample period.
31ECB (2007) mentions the following statistics on the outstanding nominal amounts of euro denominated
public debt securities as of 2004, in billion euros: Austria 114.4, Belgium 254.2, Finland 54.8, France 891.9,
Germany 1,006.6, Greece 158.8, Ireland 31.3, Italy 1,144.2, Netherlands 215.4, Spain 330.9, Portugal 72.9.
32Since April 2010, the list of eligible assets and associated haircuts can be obtained from the European
Central Bank website https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/coll/assets/html/index.en.html.
33CDS data is obtained for each country from Bloomberg covering the period from Oct 1, 2004 to Feb
28, 2011.
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defined as the slope coefficient of the regression.34 A positive coefficient is usually expected:
when the average credit quality decreases (i.e., when the CDS spreads increase), the bond’s
price decreases (i.e., its yield increases). A negative coefficient thus reveals that the bond
is seen by investors as a safe-haven investment when there is a Flight to Quality episode.
Accordingly, the dummy DFtoQ that takes value one if Flight to Quality is negative, and
zero otherwise. We find evidence of heterogeneity in haircuts (with an average haircut of
3.44%), and credit quality (with an average CDS od 27.65). Interestingly, we find that the
average coefficient of the Flight to Quality regressions in our sample of bonds is negative and
equal to −0.06, which confirms that sovereign bonds are traditionally viewed as safe-haven
investments. This heterogeneity across individual bonds in terms of activity and credit risk
is one of the key advantages of our dataset on European Treasury markets. We will further
exploit this heterogeneity in the subsequent Section 5.3.
In our empirical investigation, our main measure of market illiquidity, the effective bid-
ask spread, as well as two alternative proxies, namely the bid-ask spread and the price impact
measures, are computed using intraday data. 35 We then construct the weekly time series
for each bond in the sample. Overall, the dataset provides us with more than 500 million
quote and trade observations (intraday) and 62,176 bond-weeks. Our last proxy, Amihud’s
ILLIQ measure, is constructed on a weekly basis from daily data.
Table 2 reports summary statistics of the market illiquidity measures discussed in Section
3. In Panel (a), we report the mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) across bonds by
country. Both spread measures seem to be in line, but they do not rank countries in terms
of market illiquidity similarly as Amihud’s and the price impact measures. This suggests
that various measures may capture different aspects of market illiquidity. Quite intuitively,
34We thank Markus Brunnermeier for useful suggestions on this issue.
35In fact, the MTS Data database contains details of quotes and trades electronically recorded with time
stamps accurate to the millisecond. The trades dataset records the execution price, quantity and the buy or
sell direction for each transaction. The quotes dataset includes the proposed price and quantity up to the
best three levels.
19
the effective spread seems to be higher for countries in which bonds that are characterized
by a higher average yield, a longer average time to maturity, or a lower number of trades
per week. Interestingly, having more market makers does not seem to be linked to lower
market illiquidity. Panel (b) reports the statistics of the distribution of the cross-section of
bonds. In line with arguments suggesting strategic order submission from market partic-
ipants, effective spread are on average lower than quoted spreads. Note that spreads are
measured in basis points: an average effective spread of 3.74bp on an average transaction
size of 7.23 million euros corresponds to a transaction cost of 2, 704 euros. The large het-
erogeneity across bonds’ liquidity measures in our sample echoes the heterogeneity on their
characteristics documented in Table 1. Panel (c) reports correlations between the various
illiquidity measures. In line with existing studies, all measures are found to be highly corre-
lated. Amihud’s illiquidity measure is less correlated with the other measures than any other
pair, with correlation coefficients with the three other measures ranging from 0.64 to 0.66.
Nonetheless, the correlations reported are large and economically significant. This suggests
that our results should be robust to the choice of the market illiquidity measure.
We compute the money market spreads using data on OIS, Euribor and Repo rates from
Thomson Reuters’ Datastream. We use our dataset containing all bonds traded in EuroMTS
to compute the Noise measure. Funding illiquidity measures are reported in Table 3, Panel
(a) but only the first two measures can be directly compared. The Euribor-Repo spread is
on average higher than the Euribor-OIS spread, which reflects that the former measure may
reflect changes in funding conditions that may not be only related to the counterparty risk
of the institution but to changes in market conditions. All measures exhibit large standard
deviations denoting some potential misspecification due to the estimation process and the
variability of market interest rates. Panel (b) reports the correlation among all funding
illiquidity measures. All variables are significantly correlated at 1% level. The correlation
between the noise measure and the Euribor-OIS spread is small, but it is highly correlated
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with the MRO, i.e., the central bank rate spread.36
4.3 Systematic components of market and funding illiquidity
In this section we discuss the construction of the systematic measures of funding and market
illiquidity, FILLIQ and MILLIQ henceforth, computed as the first principal component
of the relative menu of empirical proxies from both panels of illiquidity measures defined as
in Section 3.
First, the results reported in Table 4, Panel (a) suggest that the first principal component
of both panels of measures is sufficient to capture 81 and 57 percent of the cross-sectional
variability of the market and funding illiquidity measures, respectively. This result echoes the
one reported in Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) where a single factor can sufficiently explain the
variability of the cross-section of market liquidity proxies computed for individual equities.
Our finding also suggests that there are stronger and significant commonalities driving the
time-series variation of funding and market illiquidity proxies in the European Treasury bond
markets. In Panel (b), we notice that the factor loadings of all individual measures on their
first principal component are positive and in the interval [0.40, 0.59]. The second component
of funding illiquidity seems to be linked to the MRO and Noise measures, while the second
component of market liquidity seems mainly correlated with Amihud’s ILLIQ measure.37
Besides, correlations with the standard illiquidity measures reported in Panel (c) all stand
within an interval [0.60, 0.96]. The Repo measure seems to be the most correlated with the
FILLIQ measure (i.e., with correlation coefficient of 0.88), while the effective spread seems
to be the most correlated with the MILLIQ measure (i.e., with a correlation coefficient of
36The time series of all funding illiquidity proxies, not reported to save space, show that all measures
increase at the end of 2009. This is in line with the timing of European sovereign bond crisis. See the next
Section 4.3 for a discussion of the time-series dynamics of the systematic component of funding illiquidity.
37The NOISE measure requires a curve-fitting method to compute the equilibrium values of bond yields.
However, this preliminary step may cause the empirical proxy for funding illiquidity to be imprecisely
estimated. As a simple check, we have computed the first principal component of funding illiquidity proxies
with and without the NOISE measure and found that the correlation between the two resulting FILLIQ
measures is 0.95 and statistically significant.
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0.96).
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Baseline estimations
Figure 1 plots the time series of the market illiquidity measure in Panel (a), and of the
funding illiquidity measure in Panel (b). It is worth noting that the estimated proxies for
the two dimensions of liquidity are significantly correlated over time. In fact, the contempo-
raneous correlation between the systematic component of market and funding illiquidity is
equal to 0.71 and is statistically significant at 1 percent level.38 However, as highlighted in
the previous sections, the intrinsic endogeneity between two variables may lead to spurious
conclusions. We address and discuss this important issue in this section.
Prior to estimating the reduced-form model, we first formally test that the time-series of
the variables of interest exhibit heteroskedasticity. To this aim we use the White and the
Breusch-Pagan tests that are routinely used to assess the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity.
The results of the test are reported in Table 5, Panel (a) and there is a unambiguous evidence
that the liquidity proxies exhibit heteroskedasticity over the sample period, whatever the
measure of liquidity considered. This evidence allows us to confidently use the procedure
discussed in Section 3.1.
Table 5, Panel (b) reports the variances and covariances of the market and funding illiq-
uidity measures in the three regimes. The “low vStoxx” regime (12.31% of our observations)
is characterized by a low volatility of both illiquidity measures. The “high vStoxx” regime
(10.77% of our observations) is characterized by a high volatility of both illiquidity measures.
The intermediate regime is characterized by a high volatility of funding illiquidity (namely
0.38, relative to 0.03 in the low vStoxx regime) but a relatively low volatility of market
38Similar calculations for the measures BAS, EBAS, IMP and ILLIQ against FILLIQ record correlations
equal to 0.71, 0.70, 0.63, and 0.64, respectively. Conversely, correlation coefficients computed for the Euribor-
OIS spread, the Euribor-Repo spread, the MRO-OIS spread, and the noise measure against MILLIQ are
equal to 0.40, 0.47, 0.78, and 0.72 respectively.
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illiquidity (namely 0.26 relative to 0.09 in the low vStoxx regime). The variances of the
innovations when market and funding illiquidity are proxied by the effective spread and the
Euribor-OIS spread respectively, reported in the three rows below, are qualitatively similar.
The three regimes exhibit sufficient variation in volatilities that is required to identify our
parameters of interest. Figure 1 also plots the time series of the residuals of the funding and
market illiquidity measures in the three different regimes. While the “high vStoxx” regime
mainly corresponds to the peak of the financial crisis, observations in the two other regimes
do not correspond to a specific time period.
We finally estimate the reduced-form model described by equations (4)-(5) in Section
3.1. The first two exogenous variables used to proxy for common factors affecting illiquidity,
namely mutual funds’ net in flows to Treasury bond portfolios and the variations in M2
money supply in the Euro area, capture variations in the borrowing capacities of financial
institutions/arbitrageurs, either due to the size of the assets under management or to mone-
tary policy. We proxy mutual funds flows by net inflows in billion USD in government bonds
with intermediate and long maturities for the European countries, from EFPR reports.39
We control for volatility, measured by changes in the implied volatility obtained from stock
market option prices in the euro-area (i.e the vStoxx index) since many market microstruc-
ture models suggest that volatility negatively impacts market liquidity (e.g., either due to
inventory management or to adverse selection costs).40 Finally, we also include an end-of-
the-month dummy to control for the discrete variation of European repo rates during the
last trading day of each month. This choice is due to the empirical observation of European
banks that are required to report their positions to the European Central Bank on the last
trading day of each month. To complete the set of exogenous variables we also include the
39For further details on EPFR, see Jotikasthira, Lundblad, and Ramadorai (2012). As the time series
is reported at the monthly frequency, we use a linear interpolation to convert the variables to the weekly
frequency. The data on variations in money supply M2 is obtained from ECB’s monetary statistics.
40Theoretical models of liquidity formation also predict that volatility is a state variable affecting market
illiquidity.
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lagged values of the systematic funding and market illiquidity variables. 41
The results are reported in Table 6. The first two columns report the results of the esti-
mation using the systematic measures MILLIQ and FILLIQ, and the last two columns report
those using EBAS and Euribor-OIS as individual measures of market and funding illiquidity.
Contemporaneous shocks to funding illiquidity are found to significantly affect the average
market illiquidity across all local European Treasury bond markets, i.e., β > 0. The reverse
causality link also applies as contemporaneous shocks to our proxy of market illiquidity sig-
nificantly and positively affect funding illiquidity in the European Treasury markets, i.e.,
α > 0. Both effects are sizable and economically significant whether one considers the prin-
cipal components or the direct proxies for illiquidity. When MILLIQ and FILLIQ are used,
one standard deviation shock to funding illiquidity (i.e. tightening of funding constraints)
generates a contemporaneous increase in market illiquidity of 0.151 standard deviation across
Treasury bond markets in Europe. One standard deviation shock to MILLIQ generates a
contemporaneous change of 0.080 standard deviation in FILLIQ. Using individual measures
for market and funding illiquidity leads to similar patterns, although the parameter esti-
mates are slightly smaller. One standard deviation increase of the Euribor-OIS spread (that
is, an increment of 9.92 basis points in our sample period) generates a contemporaneous
increment of 0.35 bps in effective bid-ask spreads across Treasury bond markets in Europe,
which correspond to a deterioration of 9% relative to the average effective spread. A one
standard deviation increase in effective bid-ask spreads (2.92 bp in our sample) generates a
contemporaneous increment of the Euribor-OIS spread of 0.32 bps, which corresponds to an
improvement of 5.2% relative to the average Euribor-OIS spread. These results document
that there are indeed feedback effects between market and funding illiquidity as theory would
predict, and that the magnitude of these effects is relatively large. However, both Brunner-
meier and Pedersen (2009) and Gromb and Vayanos (2010) are agnostic on the sign of the
41We include up to three lags of the illiquidity variables are suggested by the results of conventional
Information Criteria tests.
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feedback effect, predicting a stabilizing role of financial intermediaries or illiquidity spirals
depending on the equilibrium or the model’s parameters. Our results document that both
β and α are positive, signs that are consistent with a “bad” equilibrium in which illiquidity
measures are reinforcing each other.
Mutual funds’ net inflows and an increase in M2 money supply significantly reduce mar-
ket illiquidity. Both signs are consistent with the prediction that lower “macroeconomic”
illiquidity decreases market illiquidity. Their impact on funding illiquidity is however not
significant. This finding may seem counter-intuitive; it is however in line with Chordia et al.
(2005), who show that those variables are responsible for the commonalities in market illiq-
uidity measures. Stock market volatility (vStoxx) is positively and significantly related to
bond market illiquidity but not to funding illiquidity. Consistent with much anecdotal evi-
dence, we find that funding illiquidity significantly increases at the end of the month. This
supports the argument that European banks are reluctant to lend to each other at the end
of the month for reporting reasons, therefore, funding illiquidity increases.
5.2 Assessing ITH main assumptions
The first key assumption for ITH to work is that parameters α and β are constant over
time, which need not to hold in our context. For example, the impact of funding on market
illiquidity or its feedback effect would be different in quiet and turbulent times. To assess
the validity of this assumption, we split our sample into two subsamples around Lehman
Brother’s bankruptcy in the fall of 2008, and we re-estimate the model on each of these
subsamples.42 Table 7 reports the results. We observe that the estimates of both parameters
of interest (α and β) are quite similar both economically and statistically before and during
the financial crisis, except for the market to funding coefficient (α) computed using the
individual measures of market and funding illiquidity (namely the effective spread and the
42For brevity we report the details of the characteristics of these two subsamples and descriptive statistics
on the liquidity measures or on volatility regimes by period in the Internet Appendix.
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Euribor-OIS spread) that is not significant at the 10% level during the crisis. This difference
may be due to the fact that the European Central Bank reacted to the worsening of conditions
in financial markets and to the breakdown of the interbank market in September 2008 by
providing enhanced credit support. In particular, the set of eligible collaterals accepted
by the ECB which used to be limited to high-quality assets, such as government bonds,
covered bonds and some asset-backed securities with some minimum rating, was extended.
This in turn may have mitigated the impact of market illiquidity on financial institutions’
funding constraints, which may explain our finding. This is in line with Aggarwal, Bai, and
Laeven (2016) which documents that central bank purchases of low-quality bonds mitigated
disruptions in short-term funding markets by reducing lending fees of these lower quality
bonds during periods of market stress.43
Furthermore, we formally investigate the stability of the parameter estimates by using
a test based on quintile regressions, as suggested in Rigobon (2016). The test is based on
the idea that the instability of the parameters would generate non-linearity in the parameter
estimates. In that case, the parameter estimates should be different across quintiles. Table
8 presents the test for stability across quintile in the relation between the market illiquidity
of bond j and the funding illiquidity. p-values indicate that we cannot reject the equality
of the median and respectively the 70%, 80% and 95% quintiles at the 10% level. Overall,
the evidence reported in both Table 7 and Table 8 suggests that the parameters’ stability
should not be a major concern when interpreting our findings.44
The second key ITH assumption is that the structural shocks in the system of equation
43It is also worth noting that the impact of the variation in M2 money supply and of mutual fund flows on
market illiquidity varies before and after the crisis: while the former significantly reduces illiquidity before
the crisis but has no impact during the crisis, the latter reduces market illiquidity during the crisis but not
before.
44As an additional robustness check, not reported to save space but available upon request, we have also
run a battery of conventional structural stability tests on the residuals from the estimated model. These
tests assess indirectly whether any structural instability in the parameters, not accounted for in the main
model, is transferred to the model’s residuals. In all cases, at conventional levels, we do not reject the null
of parameter instability. This provides additional support for the validity of the assumption necessary to for
the correct identification of the parameters of interest.
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(4)-(5) are not correlated. We assess the relevance of this assumption by estimating an
alternative model, based on Rigobon and Sack (2003), where an unobservable common shock
is included. As highlighted in Rigobon (2003) this amendment is equivalent to relaxing the
assumption on the correlation of the structural shocks. This however comes at a cost, as the
extended model does not allow to identify α and β. Instead, the model provides an estimate
of a parameter θ, which is defined as
θ =
(1 + α× γ)
β + γ
,
where γ is the coefficient associated with the unobserved variable. Table 9 reports the
estimates of this model, for both the subsample of 149 bonds and the full sample and for
both approaches to measuring market and funding illiquidity. In all cases, the responses of
funding to and from market illiquidity exhibit the same sign of those reported in the baseline
estimations and they are statistically significant at conventional level.
5.3 Bond characteristics and illiquidity responses: a cross-sectional
analysis
The results reported in Table 6 provide empirical evidence that, after controlling for endo-
geneity, funding illiquidity positively affects market illiquidity, and vice-versa. In this section,
we take advantage of the existence of heterogeneity across maturities and across credit risk
in our sample of bonds, as well as the heterogeneity across market participants in different
countries, to analyze the main factors impacting the strength of the relationships between
funding and market illiquidity and shed some light on the mechanism(s) governing them.
To this end, and for consistency with the results reported in Section 5.1, we define two
measures of market illiquidity for each bond, namely a direct one, and a first principal
component. We use the effective bid-ask spread EBASj,t that we have computed for each
individual bond j, and its mean EBASj. The first measure, SEBASj,t, is a time-series
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demeaned EBAS for each bond and defined as follows:45
SEBASj,t = EBASj,t − EBASj.
Hence, by construction it does not distinguish between the systematic and the idiosyncratic
components of market illiquidity for each bond market. We construct another measure
of individual bond market illiquidity based on MILLIQt defined as in Section 4.3. More
specifically, for each bond j, we compute MILLIQj,t as the first principal component of the
four proxies of market illiquidity, namely the bid-ask spread, the effective spread, the price
impact and Amihud’s illiquidity, measured at the individual bond level. The measure is then
computed as:
IdioMILLIQj,t = MILLIQj,t −MILLIQt.
IdioMILLIQj,t can be interpreted as the idiosyncratic market illiquidity component for each
bond j as it is computed as the difference between an individual bond’s measure of market
illiquidity and its systematic, or market-wide, component.
We use the two variables to carry out the estimations in the reduced-form model used in
Section 5.1. We estimate the same specification that includes lags of illiquidity variables and
the set of control variables. This exercise provides us with a cross-sectional panel of contem-
poraneous coefficients (αj, βj). Table 10, Panel (a) reports statistics on the distribution of
these coefficients. Using the IdioMILLIQj idiosyncratic measure, the average of individual
βj’s is much smaller than the estimate of β in Section 5.1. This result suggests that funding
illiquidity mainly affects the systematic component of market illiquidity, MILLIQ, rather
than the idiosyncratic illiquidity of each bond.46
The estimates of (αj, βj) are then used to identify their determinants in the cross section
45The demeaning is carried out for consistency with the construction of the second measure and to allow
for a suitable comparison.
46Note also that we do not necessarily expect a significantly positive average α when considering the
idiosyncratic component of market liquidity as we are mainly interested in the factors that can explain its
cross-sectional variation.
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of bonds. To this end, we run the following regression on the panel of bonds:
Yj = a0 + ΣkakXk,j + εj, (6)
where Yj = (αj, βj) and Xk,j is a vector of individual bond’s characteristics. We choose
characteristics using the insights from the theoretical literature. According to Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2009) and Gromb and Vayanos (2010), when funding constraints increase,
traders become reluctant to take on positions, especially positions in assets which require
high margins or more collateral. We therefore use haircuts in our regression (1). However,
as described in Section 4.2, we only have data on haircuts data for February 2011 and only
for the bonds that were not close to maturity during that month. Besides, since haircuts
are determined based on the risk and maturity of assets, significantly correlated with other
variables such as CDS (with a correlation coefficient of 0.6). In our regression (2) we therefore
include as explanatory variable the credit risk of the issuer as a proxy for fundamental risk,
measured by the CDS of the country, and we expect this variable to positively impact the
parameter βj. Gromb and Vayanos (2018) uncover another channel for long-term securities,
for which asset returns are more sensitive to capital (i.e., they have a high “arbitrage-capital
beta”). We thus include the time to maturity in our regression, and we also expect a positive
coefficient. Besides, Gromb and Vayanos (2018) show that when markets are segmented,
arbitrageurs cut their positions more in trades involving more risky assets, except when
volatility concerns the hedgeable component. To capture this idea of segmentation, we
compute the number of bonds that are available in each country in our sample: the higher
the number of bonds, the less segmented is the market, and the better arbitrageurs may
hedge. We expect the number of available bonds to negatively impact the sensitivity of
funding on market illiquidity. Finally, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) suggest that if
investors anticipate that some risky high-margin securities would have more liquidity risk,
the liquidity differential between high-volatility and low-volatility securities may increase in
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bad times. In our regression (3), we thus use the exposure of securities to Flight to Quality,
F − to−Q, that is negative when the bond is perceived as safer by the investors. We expect
the parameter estimate associated with the dummy variable to be positive.
The drivers of the responses of funding illiquidity to market illiquidity shocks, αj are
less easy to identify from the literature. We thus use the same explanatory variables as
in the regressions of βj. In the spirit of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) or Gromb and
Vayanos (2018), if the feedback effect from market to funding illiquidity is due to the use of
securities as collaterals, it should be more severe for securities that do not use much capital,
i.e., that have a low haircut, low risk or shorter maturity. We expect the parameters for
the cross-section of αj associated with haircut, time to maturity and CDS spreads to be all
negative.
The results of the cross-sectional regressions are reported in Table 10, Panels (b) and (c).
As expected, the impact of funding liquidity on market illiquidity βj significantly increases
with the bond’s haircut, with credit risk, with time to maturity. Interestingly, it decreases
significantly when the country issues more bonds or when bonds are perceived as safer assets.
Overall, the market illiquidity of the bonds that are less liquid or perceived as such, or that
have less substitutes, is more affected by variations in funding illiquidity, in line with theory.
By contrast, all our explanatory variables have an opposite effect, though not always
significant, on the cross-section of αj. In particular, we find that α’s significantly decrease
with haircut; our alphas computed using direct proxies also significantly decrease with time
to maturity, and the issuer’s credit risk. This is consistent with the fact that these bonds
that have a higher haircut, longer time to maturity or credit risk are probably used less
frequently as collateral, so that variations in market illiquidity for the latter impact less
funding illiquidity. Interestingly, bonds that are viewed as safe in Flight To Quality episodes
soften the magnitude of the effect of market illiquidity on funding illiquidity.47
47We have also carried out our estimations correcting the standard errors for the fact that the dependent
variables in the cross-sectional regressions are estimated. The results, not reported to save space, are in line
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6 Conclusions
This study explores the dynamics between market and funding illiquidity by taking into
account the multifaceted nature of illiquidity and the natural endogeneity occurring between
the two aspects of illiquidity. Using an identification technique based on the heteroskedastic-
ity of illiquidity measures on data for the European Treasury bond market, we corroborate
the existing evidence that shocks to funding constraints affect bond market illiquidity. How-
ever, we also document the existence of a positive and significant feedback effect between
market and funding illiquidity shocks suggesting that market illiquidity shocks tighten fund-
ing constraints. We exploit the heterogeneity of our sample of bonds, characterized by
different maturities and default risk, to investigate the determinants of the magnitude of
these effects in the cross-section. We find that the market-to-funding illiquidity effect is
stronger for short-term bonds and for bonds used as collaterals in repo transactions. Our
results are robust to alternative definitions of the volatility regimes, alternative samples of
bonds, and alternative model specifications.
Taken together, our findings suggests the presence of destabilizing liquidity spirals. As
shown by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), central banks can help mitigate market liquid-
ity problems in such equilibria by boosting speculators’ funding conditions during a liquidity
crisis. In addition, our results have also important implications for the literature on the
asset pricing effects of liquidity. In fact, in light of the evidence reported in our study, it is
important to consider both market and funding illiquidity shocks when assessing the effects
of liquidity shocks on asset pricing. Moreover, it is also plausible to hypothesize that fund-
ing illiquidity shocks may exert even stronger effects on asset prices than market illiquidity
shocks.48
with the ones reported in Table 10.
48In a set of preliminary results for a companion research work, we find evidence of this pecking order
when our illiquidity measures are used in an cross-sectional asset pricing exercise based on the same panel
of government bond securities.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
The table reports the average statistics for the ten Euro-area government bond markets. We only consider
fixed-rate coupon bonds with maturity between one year and thirty years, issued by the central government
and traded on the MTS platform from Oct 1, 2004 to Feb 28, 2011. We focus on the bonds that are traded at
least 15 days in each of the 3 volatility regimes. Panel (a) reports the country average statistics, and Panel
(b) reports statistics on the cross-section of bonds. In the tables, No. denotes the total number of bonds for
each country, Yield is the end-of-day miquote bond yield (in percentage),Mat. is the time to maturity (in
years), Duration is the bond duration (in years), Coupon is the coupon rate (in %), No. MM is the number
of market makers over the whole sample period, Trades is the average weekly number of transactions per
bond over the whole sample period and Size is the average trade size in mio euros over the whole period. In
Panel (b), we additionally report statistics on the bond’s Haircut, the CDS of the bond, a proxy for Flight
to Quality defined as the coefficient of the bond’s yield change regressed on the first difference of the average
spread across the 5-year CDS contracts across countries (from Bloomberg), and a dummy DFtoQ that takes
value one if Flight to Quality is negative, and zero otherwise.
Statistics by country
(a)
Country No. Yield Mat. Duration Coupon No. MM Trades Size
Austria 10 3.84 12.77 9.27 4.41 22 6 7.88
Belgium 12 3.71 13.11 9.12 4.61 29 16 8.00
Finland 5 3.42 8.80 7.23 4.70 29 14 9.43
France 28 3.54 12.60 8.70 4.63 20 8 7.01
Germany 23 3.45 10.86 7.88 4.20 20 9 6.91
Greece 14 4.11 9.98 7.49 4.91 27 17 7.57
Italy 29 3.96 13.88 8.91 2.35 40 55 5.21
Netherlands 11 3.55 11.86 8.50 4.59 25 7 8.49
Portugal 5 3.79 9.37 7.58 4.11 23 24 9.11
Spain 12 3.71 11.13 8.03 4.60 29 13 8.78
Cross-sectional statistics
(b)
Mean Median Std Min Max
No. 149
Yield 3.71 3.64 0.47 2.43 4.85
Mat. 11.98 10.13 6.76 3.02 30.09
Duration 8.41 8.14 2.98 2.74 16.92
Coupon 4.11 4.00 1.36 1.38 8.50
No. MM 27 24 15 8 76
Trades 20 11 21 3 97
Size 7.23 7.44 1.91 3.00 10.15
Haircut 3.44 3.00 2.22 0.50 10.50
CDS 27.65 21.12 18.11 4.82 89.67
Flight to quality -0.06 -0.04 0.11 -1.11 0.04
DFtoQ 0.93 1 0.26 0 1
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Table 2: Statistics of market illiquidity
The table reports the summary statistics of market illiquidity variables across European Treasury bond
markets. We only consider fixed-rate coupon bonds with maturity between one year and thirty years, issued
by the central government and traded on the MTS platform from Oct 1, 2004 to Feb 28, 2011. Market
illiquidity variables include the the effective spread (EBAS, in bp), bid-ask spread (BAS, in bp), price-
impact (IMP) and Amihud’s ILLIQ measure. The definition of all measures is discussed in Section 3. The
market illiquidity variables are equal-weighted averages across all bonds and markets on a weekly basis.
Panel (a) reports the country average statistics (the mean and the standard deviation in parenthesis), and
Panel (b) reports the mean, median, standard deviation, min and max of the cross-section of individual
bonds. Panel (c) reports the correlations between the four market illiquidity measures.
Descriptive statistics of market illiquidity variables by country
(a)
Market Illiquidity Measure
Country EBAS BAS IMP ILLIQ
Austria 4.65 (4.54) 8.52 (5.20) 0.79 (1.45) 2.14 (1.58)
Belgium 3.89 (3.52) 7.32 (4.61) 0.61 (0.87) 1.78 (1.22)
Finland 3.03 (3.39) 6.08 (4.79) 0.50 (0.92) 1.17 (1.07)
France 3.24 (2.19) 7.37 (3.43) 0.70 (0.98) 2.38 (1.25)
Germany 2.42 (1.12) 5.88 (2.06) 0.97 (1.44) 1.61 (1.03)
Greece 3.87 (4.72) 6.53 (4.62) 1.30 (2.58) 1.74 (1.55)
Italy 3.50 (2.97) 7.14 (4.31) 0.64 (0.65) 1.40 (0.82)
Netherlands 2.97 (2.03) 6.77 (3.14) 0.46 (0.46) 1.67 (0.72)
Portugal 4.50 (6.78) 6.90 (5.45) 0.68 (1.56) 1.25 (1.69)
Spain 4.42 (4.61) 7.55 (5.12) 0.67 (0.93) 1.74 (1.26)
Cross-sectional statistics of market illiquidity variables
(b)
Market Liquidity Measure
Panel EBAS BAS IMP ILLIQ
Mean 3.74 7.90 0.72 1.92
Median 2.07 4.53 0.42 1.79
Std Dev 2.92 4.73 0.70 0.69
Min 1.02 3.19 0.21 0.77
Max 11.32 16.08 3.80 4.46
AC(1) 0.95 0.96 0.86 0.69
Correlations of market illiquidity measures
(c)
Market Illiquidity Measure
Variables EBAS BAS IMP ILLIQ
EBAS 1 0.92 0.85 0.66
BAS 1 0.75 0.64
IMP 1 0.63
ILLIQ 1
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Table 3: Statistics of funding illiquidity
Panel (a) reports the summary statistics of European funding illiquidity variables from Oct 1, 2004 to Feb
28, 2011. Funding illiquidity variables include the spreads (in basis points) of the Euribor over the overnight-
index-swap (OIS) rate (Euribor), of the Euribor over the General Collateral Repo (Repo), of the ECB’s over
Main-Refinancing Operation Rates over the OIS (MRO), and the Hu, Pan and Wang (2013) measure of noise.
The definition of all measures is discussed in Section 3. The funding illiquidity variables are equal-weighted
averages across markets on a weekly basis. Mean, Std, Min, Max denote the average, standard deviation,
minimum and maximum of the variables. AC(1) denotes the first-order autocorrelation coefficients of the
variables. Panel (b) reports the correlations between the five funding illiquidity measures.
Descriptive statistics on Funding Illiquidity measures
(a)
Funding Liquidity Measure
Euribor Repo MRO Noise
Mean 6.07 6.36 18.16 0.19
Median 2.80 3.20 2.15 0.03
Std Dev 9.92 9.34 26.00 0.22
Min -17.00 -7.50 -8.50 0.03
Max 98.90 85.00 111.00 1.02
AC(1) 0.75 0.86 0.94 0.92
Correlations of funding illiquidity measures
(b)
Funding Illiquidity Measures
Variables Euribor Repo MRO Noise
Euribor 1 0.94 0.24 0.14
Repo 1 0.29 0.28
MRO 1 0.64
Noise 1
40
Table 4: Principal Component Analysis
Panel (a) reports the results from the principal component analysis of funding and market illiquidity variables.
FILLIQ is the first principal component of the changes in the four funding illiquidity variables. MILLIQ
denotes the first principal component of the changes in the four market illiquidity variables. Panel (b) reports
the factor weights in the PCA decomposition. Panel (c) reports the correlations of the FILLIQ and MILLIQ
measures with the standard illiquidity measures defined in Section 3.
Principal component analysis of funding and market illiquidity variables
(a)
Funding Illiquidity Measures Market Illiquidity Measures
Eigenvalue Proportion Cumulative Eigenvalue Proportion Cumulative
PC1 2.28 0.57 0.57 3.25 0.81 0.81
PC2 1.30 0.33 0.90 0.44 0.11 0.92
PC3 0.36 0.09 0.99 0.26 0.06 0.99
Principal component analysis - Factor weights
(b)
Funding Illiquidity Measures Market Illiquidity Measures
Euribor Repo MRO Noise EBAS BAS IMP ILLIQ
PC1 0.55 0.59 0.43 0.40 0.53 0.51 0.50 0.45
PC2 -0.46 -0.37 0.54 0.60 -0.28 -0.26 -0.22 0.89
PC3 -0.07 0.13 -0.72 0.68 -0.15 -0.60 0.79 -0.02
Contemporaneous Correlation Coefficients Across Illiquidity Measures
(c)
Funding Illiquidity Measures Market Illiquidity Measures
Correlation Euribor Repo MRO Noise EBAS BAS IMP ILLIQ
FILLIQ 0.84 0.88 0.65 0.60
MILLIQ 0.96 0.93 0.90 0.80
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Table 5: Volatility regimes
Panel (a) reports the results from the White and the Breusch-Pagan heteroskedasticity test for funding and
market illiquidity variables over the sample period from Oct 1, 2004 to Feb 28, 2011. The first two columns
correspond to funding and market illiquidity defined as the principal component of a panel of empirical
proxies. FILLIQ is the first principal component of the changes in the four funding illiquidity variables.
MILLIQ denotes the first principal component of the changes in the four market illiquidity variables. The
last two columns corresponds to measures of funding illiquidity and market illiquidity as respectively the
Euribor-OIS spread and the effective bid-ask spread. From the vStoxx index, we classify three volatility
regimes. Panel (b) reports the variances and covariances of the innovations in the market and funding
illiquidity measures in the three regimes, for the systematic components and the single measures.
Tests for Heteroskedasticity
(a)
Variables FILLIQ MILLIQ Euribor EBAS
White Statistic 19.91 34.52 11.94 24.33
Breusch-Pagan Statistic 18.64 35.37 11.20 22.98
Variance-Covariance of the innovations under different regimes
(b)
Variables Low vStoxx Interm. vStoxx High vStoxx
Variance of MILLIQ 0.09 0.26 0.70
Variance of FILLIQ 0.03 0.38 2.68
Covariance MILLIQ, FILLIQ 0.01 0.03 0.33
Variance of EBAS 0.055 0.137 0.344
Variance of EURIBOR 0.028 0.311 2.104
Covariance EBAS , EURIBOR 0.002 0.004 0.153
No. of obs. 40 250 35
Freq. of obs. 12.31% 76.92% 10.77%
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Table 6: Heteroskedasticity identification
The table shows the coefficients and the t-values (in parentheses) of the parameters of the structural model
based on Rigobon (2003). The first two columns correspond to funding and market illiquidity defined as the
principal component of a panel of empirical proxies. FILLIQ is the first principal component of the changes
in the four funding illiquidity variables. MILLIQ denotes the first principal component of the changes in
the four market illiquidity variables. The last two columns corresponds to measures of funding illiquidity
and market illiquidity as respectively the Euribor-OIS spread and the effective bid-ask spread. p-values are
obtained from bootstrap with 1,000 replications. ∗∗∗ indicates that coefficients are significantly different
from zero at the 1% level.
First Principal Components Direct proxies
MILLIQ FILLIQ EBAS Euribor
β (funding to market) 0.151∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(57.12) (53.90)
α (market to funding) 0.080∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(28.47) (16.88)
Implied volatility (vStoxx) 0.016∗∗∗ 0.008 0.009∗∗∗ −0.002
(4.14) (0.13) (4.33) (−0.46)
Variation in M2 money supply −0.220∗∗∗ −0.013 −0.131∗∗∗ 0.018
(−4.06) (−0.28) (−4.06) (0.34)
Mutual funds’ flows −0.380∗∗∗ 0.081 −0.012∗ 0.005
(−2.55) (0.29) (−1.86) (0.36)
End-of-month dummy −0.023 0.250∗∗∗ 0.05 0.22∗∗∗
(-0.37) (2.38) (1.06) (2.44)
markett−1 0.574∗∗∗ 0.135∗ 0.518∗∗∗ 0.140
(10.22) (1.68) (9.22) (1.42)
markett−2 0.197∗∗∗ 0.176∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.067
(3.05) (1.91) (2.93) (0.61)
markett−3 −0.046 −0.230∗ 0.174∗∗∗ −0.136
(−0.71) (-2.47) (2.81) (-1.24)
fundingt−1 0.061 0.810∗∗∗ −0.009 0.634∗∗∗
(1.51) (14.13) (−0.29) (11.23)
fundingt−2 −0.069 −0.243∗∗∗ 0.027 −0.008
(−1.35) (−3.33) (0.71) (−0.12)
fundingt−3 −0.043 0.181∗∗ −0.036 0.136∗∗
(−0.83) (2.46) (−0.93) (1.98)
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Table 7: Estimation before / during the financial crisis
The table shows the coefficients and the t-values (in parentheses) of the parameters of the structural model
based on Rigobon (2003). Panel (a) reports the results on the non-crisis period (from Oct 1, 2004 to Sept
30, 2008), while Panel (b) reports the results on the crisis period (from Oct 1, 2008 to Feb 28, 2011). The
first two columns correspond to funding and market illiquidity defined as the principal component of a panel
of empirical proxies. FILLIQ is the first principal component of the changes in the four funding illiquidity
variables. MILLIQ denotes the first principal component of the changes in the four market illiquidity
variables. The last two columns corresponds to measures of funding illiquidity and market illiquidity as
respectively the Euribor-OIS spread and the effective bid-ask spread. p-values are obtained from bootstrap
with 1,000 replications. ∗∗∗ indicates that coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
Before the financial crisis (from Oct 1, 2004 to Sept 30, 2008)
(a)
First Principal Components Direct proxies
MILLIQ FILLIQ EBAS Euribor
β (funding to market) 0.15∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(27.66) (28.21)
α (market to funding) 0.10∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(35.61) (8.63)
Implied volatility (vStoxx) 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01 0.008∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(3.06) (0.11) (2.18) (2.32)
Variation in M2 money supply −0.18∗∗∗ −0.06 −0.083∗∗∗ 0.064
(−2.61) (−0.82) (−2.21) (−1.10)
Mutual funds’ flows −0.00 0.00 −0.002 0.003
(−0.86) (1.12) (−0.33) (1.22)
End-of-month dummy −0.04 0.24∗∗∗ 0.022 0.054
(-0.53) (2.76) (0.56) (0.88)
During the financial crisis (from Oct 1, 2008 to Feb 28, 2011)
(b)
First Principal Components Direct proxies
MILLIQ FILLIQ EBAS Euribor
β (funding to market) 0.16∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(39.68) (11.32)
α (market to funding) 0.08∗∗∗ 0.020
(13.48) (1.62)
Implied volatility (vStoxx) 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01 0.010∗∗∗ −0.009
(2.93) (1.99) (1.98) (−1.34)
Variation in M2 money supply 0.14 −0.57∗∗∗ −0.006 0.199
(0.63) (−2.38) (−0.03) (0.85)
Mutual funds’ flows −0.01∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.007∗∗∗ 0.001
(−2.38) (0.12) (−2.03) (0.82)
End-of-month dummy −0.00 0.27∗∗∗ 0.110 0.354∗∗∗
(0.02) (1.76) (0.88) (2.17)
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Table 8: Parameter stability and quantile regressions
The table reports the p-values of the null-hypothesis H0 : φm = φq computed by estimating quantile
regressions. φ = α, β as in equations (1) and (2) of the main text and m, q are the median and q-percentile,
respectively.
H0: φm = φ0.7 φm = φ0.8 φm = φ0.95
First principal components
funding to market (β) 0.60 0.12 0.88
market to funding (α) 0.99 0.93 0.75
Direct measures
funding to market (β) 0.85 0.14 0.46
market to funding (α) 0.58 0.97 0.54
Table 9: Rigobon and Sack (2003)’s identification
The Table reports the estimates of an identification model based on Rigobon and Sack (2003). The model
controls for an unobservable common shock, but prevents the complete characterization of the alpha pa-
rameter. Instead, we obtain theta = (1+alpha*gamma)/(beta+gamma). Values in parenthesis denote the
t-values obtained by bootstrapping with 1,000 replications. ∗∗∗ indicates that coefficients are significantly
different from zero at the 1% level.
Variables MILLIQ FILLIQ
First Principal components
beta 0.164∗∗∗ (19.70)
theta 0.223∗∗∗ (14.89)
Direct proxies
beta 0.182∗∗∗ (14.70)
theta 0.167∗∗∗ (15.64)
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1 Appendix 1: Identification strategy
The appendix follows the identification strategy in the Section Identification through het-
eroskedasticity of Moinas, Nguyen and Valente (2018).
mt = βft + t (1)
ft = αmt + ηt, (2)
The covariance matrix of the reduced-form residuals in (1) model in each regime i (i =
1, ..., I volatility regimes) can be given as:
Ωi ≡
[
$11,i $12,i
. $22,i
]
(3)
=
1
(1− αβ)2
[
β2σ2η,i + σ
2
,i β
2σ2η,i + ασ
2
,i
. σ2η,i + α
2σ2,i
]
, (4)
where αβ 6= 1. In each regime, the covariance matrix provides three equations to solve
the unknown variables. The three equations can be written as follows:
β2σ2η,i + σ
2
,i = (1− αβ)2$11,i (5)
β2σ2η,i + ασ
2
,i = (1− αβ)2$12,i (6)
σ2η,i + α
2σ2,i = (1− αβ)2$22,i (7)
Solving these equations leads to the following moment condition:
$12,i − β$22,i
$11,i − β$12,i − α = 0, (8)
When the number of volatility regimes I is exactly the same as the number of endogenous
variables, i.e. two in our case, β needs to statistfy the following condition:
1
$12,1 − β$22,1
$11,1 − β$12,1 =
$12,2 − β$22,2
$11,2 − β$12,2 , (9)
After some algebra, β solves the quadratic equation1:
aβ2 − bβ + c = 0, (10)
where
a = $22,1 ×$12,2 −$22,2 ×$12,1 (11)
b = $22,1 ×$11,2 −$22,2 ×$11,1 (12)
c = $12,1 ×$11,2 −$12,2 ×$11,1 (13)
When the number of regimes of volatility I is exactly greater than the number of en-
dogenous variables, GMM estimation can be used with the moment condition specified as
above.
1The quadratic equation has two solutions. One is the values of α and β in the system of equation. The
other is given as the system in which the order of funding liquidity is first and then market liquidity. In that
case, the solution gives the values α∗ = 1/β and β∗ = 1/α.
2
2 Appendix 2: Model with exogenous variables
This appendix discusses an extension of the reduced-form model presented in Section 3.3
of the main text by including exogenous variables. As Rigobon (2003) and Rigobon and
Sack (2003) we start from the observation that market and funding liquidity are determined
simultaneously and we model their time-series dynamics by using the following system:
mt = βft + θxt + γzt + t, (14)
ft = αmt + φxt + zt + ηt, (15)
where mt is the systematic component of market illiquidity, ft is the systematic component
of funding illiquidity, xt is a vector of exogenous variables, zt is a latent variable, t and ηt
are shocks in each equation. The variable zt is included to capture the influence of other
determinants of illiquidity that we do not observe, unlike xt that are instead observable. For
identification purposes, as in Rigobon and Sack (2003, p. 643) the parameter of the common
shock zt is normalized to one in the second equation while β, α, θ, φ are the free parameters
of the model.
The equations can be written in a reduced-form model as follows:
(
mt
ft
)
= Φxt +
(
νmt
νft
)
,
where the reduced form residuals
(
νmt and ν
f
t
)
are related to the structural shocks as
follows:
νmt =
1
1− αβ [(β + γ) zt + βηt + t] , (16)
νft =
1
1− αβ [(1 + αγ) zt + ηt + αt] (17)
The covariance matrix of the reduced-form residuals can be given as:
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Ω =
1
(1− αβ)2
[
(β + γ)2σ2z + β
2σ2η + σ
2
 (1 + αγ) (β + γ)σ
2
z + β
2σ2η + ασ
2

. (1 + αγ)2 σ2z + σ
2
η + α
2σ2
]
, (18)
We assume that the data exhibits i = 1, ..., I volatility regimes, of which the covari-
ance matrix of the reduced form residuals in regime i can be written as Ωi. Let θ =
(1 + αγ) / (β + γ) . and ∆Ωij,km denote element (k, m) of the matrix ∆Ωij, , which is the
difference between the covariance matrix in regime i and regime j. If θβ 6= 1, which assures fi-
nite variance, Rigobon and Sack (2003) suggest the following moment conditions with regime
i (i 6= 1):
∆Ωi1,12 − β∆Ωi1,22
∆Ωi1,11 − β∆Ωi1,12 − θ = 0, (19)
When the number of volatility regime I is exactly the same as the number of endoge-
nous variables plus the number of common shock, Rigobon and Sack (2003) show that the
parameter β can be obtained by solving the quadratic equation:
aβ2 − bβ + c = 0,
where
a = ∆Ω31,22∆Ω21,12 −∆Ω21,22∆Ω31,12 (20)
b = ∆Ω31,22∆Ω21,11 −∆Ω21,22∆Ω31,11 (21)
c = ∆Ω31,12∆Ω21,11 −∆Ω21,12∆Ω31,11 (22)
If the number of I is greater than the number of endogenious variables plus the number of
common shock, GMM estimation technique needs to be applied. Using the rolling-variance
method, we specify I = 4 volatility regimes, one where the two liquidity measures demon-
strate high conditional volatility, two regimes where one variable remains in low volatility
state, one regime where all variables stay in low volatility state. We obtain the parameters
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by using the (19) moment conditions in the GMM estimation. We establish the distributions
of the estimated coefficients and perform significance tests in 1000 replications.
3 Appendix 3: Additional results
We perform a number of additional tests to complement our baseline results. More specif-
ically, we investigate the role played by the sample of bonds used in the empirical exer-
cise, a different volatility-regime classification. We also provide and estimate an alternative
parametrization of the reduced-form model. In all cases, we document that the baseline
results reported in the previous section are robust to alternative choices.
3.1 Sample of bonds
Our main analysis focuses on a subsample of 149 bonds that are traded in the platform
EuroMTS at least fifteen days in each of the three volatility regimes, defined exogenously
based on variation in the vStoxx index. This restriction enables us to compare estimates
of αj and βj in the cross-section of bonds since all the estimations are based on the same
volatility regimes. However, it induces us to restrict our attention to a subsample of bonds.
In this section, we check the robustness of our results to the sample of bonds, by estimating
the reduced-form model using an extended sample of 452 bonds traded in EuroMTS over
the sample period.
Table 1, Panel (a) reports some descriptive statistics on the full sample, by country. In
comparison with Table 1 of the main text, we find that the characteristics of the bonds
by country in the subsample are similar to those in the full sample, except for the fact
that they have on average shorter time to maturity and duration. Given that the subsample
requires trades in each volatility regime, it may not be surprising to observe that the condition
mainly excludes bonds with shorter maturities. Including more bonds with shorter maturities
increases the trading volume of all but Finish bonds.
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We estimate the model for the direct proxies of market and funding illiquidity, and for
the measures defined as the first principal components. We construct systematic components
FILLIQ and MILLIQ from both panels of funding and market illiquidity measures across
proxy measures and Treasury bond markets by a adopting principal components approach.
The results (omitted for brevity) suggest that the first principal component of both panels
captures 57 and 75 percent of the cross-sectional variability of the funding and market
illiquidity measures, respectively. Besides, the heteroskedasticity tests also reject the null
hypothesis of homoskedasticity for both FILLIQ and MILLIQ at the 1% level.
Table 1, Panel (b) reports the estimates of the reduced-form model similar to the one
discussed in Section 5 of the main text. The results are perfectly in line with those reported in
Table 6, although slightly less economically significant. In particular, both effects of funding
to and from market illiquidity are positive and significant, with coefficients of 0.06− 0.07 for
β and 0.05 for α, respectively.
As an final robustness check we estimate an alternative model, based on Rigobon and Sack
(2003). The model includes an unobservable common shock, which accounts for potential
omitted control variables. This however comes at a cost, as the extended model does not
allow to identify α and β. Instead, the model provides an estimate of a parameter θ, which
is defined as
θ =
(1 + α× γ)
β + γ
,
where γ is the coefficient associated with the unobserved variable. Table 2 reports the
estimates of this model for the full sample and for both approaches to measuring market and
funding illiquidity. In all cases, the responses of funding to and from market illiquidity are
positive, significant, and close to those reported previously.
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3.2 Different Volatility-regime Classification
As an additional robustness check we identify the volatility regimes directly from the time-
series data. More specifically, we define the various regimes from the reduced-form residuals
by computing rolling-window variances of N-week worth of observations for each variable.
As in Rigobon and Sack (2003), a high (low) volatility regime is assigned if the volatility of
that variable is larger (smaller) than its average value plus the value of the average volatility
times a coefficient c. We report the results of the estimation using a moving-average estimate
of volatility for the various time series of N = 20 weeks with a threshold parameter c = 0.5.2
Table 3 reports the results of the estimation of the reduced-form model defined in (??)
on the sample of 149 bonds and on the full sample, for the direct measures of illiquidity and
the first principal components. Again, both effects of funding to and from market illiquidity
are positive and significant. The coefficients of 0.150 for β and 0.067 for α for the subsample
that we obtain when using principal component measures, and of 0.132 for β and 0.04 for α
for the full sample, are very close from the values obtained with the alternative definition of
volatility regimes.
2We have used additional rolling windows of 10, 30 and 40 weeks to estimate the volatility of the various
time series and additional thresholds of c = 0.25, 0.75, 1.0 to classify high-volatility regimes. The results of
this robustness check are available upon request. In all cases, the results of our baseline estimations are
confirmed.
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Table 1: Full sample of bonds
Panel (a) reports the country average statistics for the full sample of the ten Euro-area government bond
markets. We consider all fixed-rate coupon bonds with maturity between one year and thirty years, issued
by the central government and traded on the MTS platform from Oct 1, 2004 to Feb 28, 2011. No. denotes
the total number of bonds for each country,Yield is the end-of-day miquote bond yield (in percentage),
Mat is the time to maturity (in years), Duration is the bond duration (in years), Coupon is the coupon
rate (in percentage), No. MM is the number of market makers, Trades is the average weekly number of
transactions per bond over the whole sample period and Size is the average trade size over the whole period.
Panel (b) shows the coefficients and the t-values (in parentheses) of the parameters of the structural model
based on Rigobon (2003), estimated on the full sample of bonds. The first two columns correspond to
funding and market illiquidity defined as the principal component of a panel of empirical proxies. FILLIQ
is the first principal component of the changes in the four funding illiquidity variables. MILLIQ denotes
the first principal component of the changes in the four market illiquidity variables. The last two columns
corresponds to measures of funding illiquidity and market illiquidity as respectively the Euribor-OIS spread
and the effective bid-ask spread. p-values are obtained from bootstrap with 1,000 replications. ∗∗∗ indicates
that coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
Statistics by country on the full sample of bonds
(a)
Country No. Yield Mat. Duration Coupon No. MM Trades Size
Austria 19 3.65 10.83 7.84 4.63 28 61 4.46
Belgium 34 3.46 8.47 6.42 5.01 35 226 5.02
Finland 13 3.27 7.69 6.30 4.37 35 79 4.76
France 70 3.32 7.94 5.96 4.70 24 256 4.39
Germany 104 3.16 6.68 5.06 4.26 27 256 4.39
Greece 35 3.84 7.80 5.87 5.02 35 212 4.27
Italy 86 3.62 8.53 5.96 2.36 51 2,476 3.28
Netherlands 31 3.29 8.25 6.22 4.35 28 105 5.78
Portugal 21 3.65 9.20 7.02 4.50 37 215 4.89
Spain 39 3.56 8.70 6.40 4.65 37 187 4.88
Heteroskedasticity identification on the full sample of bonds
(b)
First Principal Components Direct proxies
MILLIQ FILLIQ EBAS Euribor
β (funding to market) 0.063∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(5.18) (20.83)
α (market to funding) 0.052∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(32.64) (3.16)
Implied volatility (vStoxx) 0.021∗∗∗ 0.008 0.033∗∗∗ 0.064
(3.99) (1.17) (5.25) (1.16)
Variation in M2 money supply −0.050∗∗∗ −0.130 −0.151∗∗∗ 0.070
(−1.86) (−1.92) (−3.69) (0.18)
Mutual funds’ flows −0.160∗∗∗ −0.023 −0.440∗ −0.465
(−2.02) (−0.08) (−1.86) (−0.19)
End-of-month dummy 0.038 0.220∗∗∗ 1.270 1.840∗∗∗
(0.64) (2.09) (1.52) (2.39)
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Table 2: Rigobon and Sack (2003)’s identification
The Table reports the estimates of an identification model based on Rigobon and Sack (2003). The model
controls for an unobservable common shock, but prevents the complete characterisation of the alpha pa-
rameter. Instead, we obtain theta = (1+alpha*gamma)/(beta+gamma). Values in parenthesis denote the
t-values obtained by bootstrapping with 1,000 replications. ∗∗∗ indicates that coefficients are significantly
different from zero at the 1% level.
Full sample
Variables MILLIQ FILLIQ
First Principal components
beta 0.141∗∗∗ (28.31)
theta 0.280∗∗∗ (8.45)
Direct proxies
beta 0.104∗∗∗ (16.70)
theta 0.446∗∗∗ (9.92)
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Table 3: Volatility regimes defined based on rolling-window variances
In line with Rigobon and Sack (2003), we define the various regimes globally from the reduced-form residuals
by computing rolling-window variances of 20-week worth of observations for each variable. A high (low)
volatility regime is assigned if the volatility of that variable is larger (smaller) than its average value plus
the value of the average volatility times a coefficient c = 0.5. The Table reports the results of the estimation
of the reduced-form model a la Rigobon (2003) defined in (??), on the subsample of 149 bonds as well as on
the full sample. Values in parenthesis denote the t-values obtained by bootstrapping with 1,000 replications.
∗∗∗ indicates that coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
Subsample of 149 bonds Full sample
Variables MILLIQ FILLIQ MILLIQ FILLIQ
First Principal components
beta 0.150∗∗∗ (78.10) 0.132∗∗∗ (32.91)
alpha 0.067∗∗∗ (25.06) 0.04∗∗∗ (11.25)
Direct proxies
beta 0.039∗∗∗ (6.12) 0.132∗∗∗ (23.41)
alpha 0.052∗∗∗ (2.09) 0.107∗∗∗ (19.35)
